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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.
V. CAMPBELL: REFINING BMW OF NORTH AMERICA,
INC. V. GORE AND FURTHER RESTRICTING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages hold a unique place in modern American
law. Described as "quasi-criminal" in nature by the Supreme
Court of the United States,1 punitive damages are a private civil
remedy aimed at serving the public societal purposes of punish-
ment and deterrence-which are also the primary purposes of
criminal sentencing.2 Punitive damages depend on an underlying
claim for compensatory damages.3 However, punitive awards pro-
vide a means by which a jury can award monetary damages to a
plaintiff based not on compensation for any loss to the plaintiff,
but for the purposes of punishing the defendant and deterring
similar acts by the defendant and others.4
Throughout most of American litigation history, punitive dam-
ages drew little attention.5 It was not until the late 1970s that
America saw an increase in punitive awards.6 The trend contin-
ued for nearly two decades, escalating to multi-million dollar
sums.7 In the latter part of this trend, the Supreme Court heard a
series of cases on the constitutionality of large punitive damages,'
1. Mark A. Kiugheit, "Where the Rubber Meets the Road"- Theoretical Justifications
vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 811
(2002) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001)).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 805.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 815-16.
6. Id. at 816.
7. See id. at 807.
8. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989), was the Court's first substantial treatment of punitive damages. The Court dis-
missed the claim that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to
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but did not overturn a punitive award until BMW of North Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Gore9 in 1996. Gore addressed the constitutional limi-
tations on excessive punitive damages under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' and set forth guideposts
for assessing punitive damages in accordance with due process. 1
The Court continued to recognize the Gore guideposts when it de-
cided State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,12
the Court's latest ruling on excessive punitive damages. This note
discusses State Farm and its effect on Gore. Part II addresses the
due process issues of excessive punitive damages in Gore. Part III
deals with the history of the State Farm case, the majority opin-
ion in relation to Gore, and the dissenting opinions. Part IV ana-
lyzes State Farm's refinements to Gore, looks at the lower courts'
reception and implementation of State Farm, and considers what
implications State Farm has on punitive damages.
II. GORE: DUE PROCESS ISSUES IN ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Gore Court struggled with the broad and abstract concepts
of due process as they relate to punitive damages. The narrower
and more tangible issue in the lower court was whether BMW
punitive damages between private parties, but noted that it had never addressed the pre-
cise question of whether due process could possibly check a large punitive damage award
in the absence of any statutory limit. Id. at 276-77. Two years later, in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), the Court met its untouched question from
Browning-Ferris head-on in deciding "whether the Due Process Clause renders the puni-
tive damages award in this case constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at 18. The Court ac-
cepted the possibility that a punitive award could be in violation of due process, but up-
held the punitive award. Id. at 18-19. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), the Court upheld a punitive award that was nearly 526 times
larger than the actual damages award. Id. at 459. The Court did not consider the disparity
between the two awards to be controlling in the case, looking instead to the defendant's
bad faith, patterned fraud, trickery, and deceitful activities to hold that allowing the
award was within the power of the state. Id. at 462. Nonetheless, the majority fully recog-
nized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
imposing a "grossly excessive'" punishment on a civil defendant. Id. at 454 (quoting Wa-
ters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)). For a more complete discus-
sion of the evolution of the Court's treatment of punitive damages leading up to Gore, see
George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other
Monetary Punishments, 57 Bus. LAw. 587, 598-604 (2002), and Klugheit, supra note 1, at
816-20.
9. 517 U.S. 559(1996).
10. Id. at 562-63.
11. Id. at 574-86.
12. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
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fraudulently failed to disclose to Gore, the buyer of a new BMW,
that his car had been repainted.13 BMW acknowledged at trial
that it had a nationwide policy of not advising its dealers, and
hence their customers, of predelivery repairs to new cars when
the repair costs did not exceed three percent of the car's sug-
gested retail price. 4 Gore's car fell into this category. 5 The jury
awarded Gore compensatory damages of $4,000 and punitive
damages of $4 million.16 The punitive award was based on the
jury's finding that BMW's nondisclosure policy was "'gross, op-
pressive or malicious' fraud." 7 The Alabama Supreme Court re-
duced the punitive damage award to $2 million.'" The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the lowered award on the
grounds that it violated due process. 9 The Court found that the
$2 million punitive damages award was "grossly excessive" and
"transcend[ed] the constitutional limit."2 °
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion emphasized this position,
stating that the punitive award "violate[d] the basic guarantee of
nonarbitrary governmental behavior that the Due Process Clause
provides."2' Due process looks to whether there is ample justifica-
tion for government action;22 thus, unjustified government action
is considered to be arbitrary and in violation of due process. As
the Gore Court pointed out, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
'grossly excessive... punishment on a tortfeasor."23 Punitive
awards found to be grossly excessive are an example of arbitrary
governmental behavior and are unconstitutional. 24 Furthermore,
in cases of civil penalties, the Due Process Clause provides basic
protection against judgments awarded without adequate notice.25
13. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 562-63.
14. Id. at 563-64.
15. Id. at 564.
16. Id. at 565.
17. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(b)(1) (1993)).
18. Id. at 567.
19. Id. at 585-86.
20. Id. at 586.
21. Id. at 597 (Breyer, J., concurring).
22. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 524 (2d
ed. 2002).
23. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 (1993)).
24. See id. at 568.
25. Id. at 574 n.22 (discussing the due process requirement of adequate and fair notice
20041
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There were two closely tied Fourteenth Amendment due process
issues at hand in Gore dealing with arbitrary state action and no-
tice of excessive punishment: (1) how punitive damages imposed
by a state are limited to the state's legitimate interests in pun-
ishment and deterrence;26 and (2) whether the defendant had fair
notice of the extent of potential punitive damages for his ac-
tions.27
A. Legitimate State Interests Limit Punitive Damages
As the Gore Court stated, "[o~nly when an award can fairly be
categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to [a state's] interests
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."" Thus, according to
the Gore Court, an excessive punitive damages inquiry must start
with an identification of the state's valid interests in the purposes
that punitive damages are designed to serve.29 The Court, there-
fore, first focused on identifying the scope of Alabama's legitimate
interests in punishing BMW and deterring the company and oth-
ers from future misconduct.3 ° The Court pointed out that states
have considerable flexibility in determining the amount of puni-
tive damages they will permit, but that states are still limited by
their own interests in punishment and deterrence.31 Gore made it
very clear that a state can only assign punitive damages for ac-
tivities that occurred within the state or that affected the state's
residents.32 The Gore Court invoked the "principles of state sover-
eignty and comity" to hold that a state cannot punish a defendant
for violating its laws with the intent of changing the defendant's
lawful behavior in other states.33 The Court further concluded
that although each state has the power to protect its own citizens,
no state may "use the punitive damages deterrent as a means of
implicated by civil penalties).
26. Id. at 568.
27. Id. at 574.
28. Id. at 568 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 456).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 572-73.
33. Id. at 572.
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imposing its regulatory policies on the entire Nation. 3 4 While
lawful activity in other states cannot be punished with punitive
damages, the question left unanswered by Gore was whether a
state could assign punitive damages to deter clearly unlawful
acts in other states.35
B. The Gore Guideposts for Fair Notice of the Extent of Punitive
Damages
Once the scope of punitive damages was properly limited, the
crux of the Gore Court's due process analysis became an issue of
notice. As the Court stated, "[ellementary notions of fairness en-
shrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."36 Thus, the due process issue in Gore was not sim-
ply the size of the punitive award itself, but whether the defen-
dant was on notice of the extent of the potential punitive damages
that he may incur for his actions.37 The Gore Court articulated
three guideposts designed to help assess whether a defendant re-
ceived adequate notice of the extent and magnitude of the sanc-
tions that a state may impose on him for his actions: (1) the de-
gree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the compari-
son of the punitive award to state civil and criminal sanctions for
similar misconduct. 8
1. Degree of Reprehensibility
The degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct is pos-
sibly the most important factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of a punitive damages award.39 Some wrongs are regarded as
34. Id. at 585.
35. Anthony J. Sebok, An Upcoming Supreme Court Punitive Damages Case Will De-
termine How Much an Individual State's Courts Can Affect Companies' Nationwide Con-
duct, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20021028.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
36. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
37. Klugheit, supra note 1, at 822.
38. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
39. Id.
2004]
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more blameworthy than others40 and certain "aggravating fac-
tors" result in greater punitive damages.41 For example, violent
crimes are worse than nonviolent crimes or those containing
threats of violence;42 "'trickery and deceit' are worse than negli-
gence;" intentional malice on the defendant's part may be associ-
ated with particularly reprehensible conduct;' and repeated mis-
conduct is worse than individual incidents of misconduct.45 Such
actions by the defendant will incur greater punitive damages.46
2. Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages
The second, and more commonly cited, guidepost of an unrea-
sonable punitive award is its ratio to the compensatory damages
awarded to the plaintiff.47 The Gore Court refused to set any fixed
numerical boundaries on this ratio, and reiterated its statement
from previous cases: "'We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every
case."'48 Instead, the Gore Court allowed a sliding-scale type of
approach to ratios,49 where actual and potential damages to the
plaintiff can be considered in the ratio of punitive to compensa-
tory damages.5 0 Factoring in potential damages to the plaintiff, a
higher ratio can be acceptable in cases of low compensatory dam-
ages where the defendant's conduct was particularly egregious
but resulted in a minimal amount of economic damages.51 Higher
ratios are also acceptable in cases where "the injury is hard to de-
tect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
40. See id.
41. Id. at 576.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 577.
46. The Court points out in Gore that the Supreme Court stated nearly 150 years ago
that "exemplary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect 'the enormity of his of-
fence.'" Id. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)).
47. Id. at 580.
48. Id. at 582-83 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 458).
49. Klugheit, supra note 1, at 834.
50. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (rejecting a bright-line test, even one that compares ac-
tual and potential damages).
51. Id.
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difficult to determine."52 The Court looked for a ""'reasonable rela-
tionship"' between punitive damages and compensatory dam-
ages, which can include potential damages to the plaintiff in some
cases. 53
3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
The third and final Gore guidepost is a comparison of the puni-
tive damages to civil and criminal penalties for the same or simi-
lar conduct.5 4 A reviewing court determining if punitive awards
are excessive must give ""'substantial deference" to legislative
judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at is-
sue." 5 The Gore Court indicated that where imprisonment is
authorized, a higher punitive award may be allotted.56 However,
the Court cautioned that large awards cannot be justified strictly
on the basis that such a sum is necessary to deter future
misconduct without considering whether a less excessive sum
could achieve the same goal. 7
Although Gore limited punitive damages both by restricting the
basis of such damages to in-state actions or actions affecting the
state's residents and by establishing three guideposts for deter-
mining fair notice, the holding left much ambiguity. One of the
strongest critics of the Gore holding was Justice Scalia.5" Among
the criticisms in his Gore dissent is his statement that the Gore
guideposts "mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guid-
ance at all."59 State Farm offers some clarity and refines the am-
biguity of Gore to some degree, but the holding is not a simple so-
lution for determining excessive punitive damages.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 581 (quoting TXO, 590 U.S. at 460). TXO confirmed that the proper in-
quiry is ""whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that has
actually occurred."' Id. (quoting TXO, 590 U.S. at 460). The Gore Court also recognized
that "[tihe principle that exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to
compensatory damages has a long pedigree." Id. at 580.
54. Id. at 583.
55. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
56. See id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)).
57. Id. at 584.
58. See id. at 598-607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2004]
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III. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co. V.
CAMPBELL AND GORE
A Case History
In 1981, Curtis Campbell was traveling with his wife on a two-
lane highway when he decided to pass six vans in front of him.6°
Campbell caused an accident that killed one person and perma-
nently disabled another.6 State Farm, Campbell's insurer, han-
dled the wrongful death and tort action against Campbell and re-
fused an offer to settle the claims for the amount of the $50,000
policy limit, even though evidence showed that State Farm knew
that Campbell was at fault and unlikely to win at trial.62 Disre-
garding the advice of its own investigators, State Farm took the
case to trial assuring Campbell that he was not liable for the ac-
cident and that his assets were safe.63 When the jury found
Campbell entirely at fault and returned a judgment of over
$185,000, State Farm refused to cover more than the $50,000 pol-
icy limit and suggested that the Campbells put their home up for
sale.' When State Farm refused to appeal, Campbell obtained his
own counsel.6 5 In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court denied Camp-
bell's appeal, at which point State Farm paid the entire judg-
ment.66
The Campbells then brought suit against State Farm for bad
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for
the eighteen-month period between State Farm's refusal to pay
the judgment and when the company did indeed pay.67 Ulti-
mately, the jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compen-
satory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.6 The trial
court reduced the damages to $1 million and $25 million respec-
tively, but the Utah Supreme Court, applying the Gore standards,
60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1517 (2003).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1517-18.
63. Id. at 1518.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1518, 1525.
68. Id. at 1519.
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reinstated the original punitive damages amount.69 State Farm
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Court granted certiorari.7" In its decision, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the Gore guideposts using de novo review as required by
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.71 The
Court affirmed Gore with some refinements and held the punitive
award of $145 million in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as "an irrational and arbitrary dep-
rivation of the property of the defendant."72
B. The Majority Opinion
In the 6-3 majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, there
was much discussion about State Farm's national activity and
conduct outside of Utah.73 Gore established that a state cannot
calculate a numerical sum of punitive damages based on the de-
fendant's lawful out-of-state conduct,7 4 but did not directly pro-
hibit evidence of the defendant's out-of-state activity in demon-
strating the degree of reprehensibility of his conduct.75 The
Campbells' case was largely built on showing that they were
harmed as part of a greater nationwide fraudulent scheme by
State Farm of capping payouts and adjusting claims to boost prof-
its.7 6 Thus, out-of-state activity was a focal point of the majority's
analysis of the first guidepost-the degree of reprehensibility of
State Farm's activity.77
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1520. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424
(2001), is a post-Gore punitive damages case that was primarily procedural and held that
"courts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district
courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards." Id. at 436.
Thus, a reviewing court must apply a de novo standard when doing a Gore analysis of ex-
cessive punitive damages. See id.
72. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
73. Id. at 1521-22.
74. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). In Gore, the jury initially
calculated the punitive damages by taking Gore's compensatory damages and multiplying
them by the number of repainted cars sold nationwide. Id. at 567.
75. See id. at 576-77.
76. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
77. Id. at 1521-24.
2004]
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1. Degree of Reprehensibility
In analyzing the first Gore guidepost, the Court demanded a
nexus between the defendant's out-of-state activity and the harm
done to the plaintiff when assessing the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct.78 The Court stated that "[l]awful out-of-state
conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberate-
ness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where
it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff."79 The Court stressed that only the
defendant's actions that bear a sufficient relation to the plaintiffs
harm can serve as the basis for punitive damages, and a defen-
dant should not be punished just "for being an unsavory individ-
ual or business. "s° Therefore, according to the Court, dissimilar
acts that are independent from the acts that are the premise of
liability cannot be the basis for punitive damages."1 While Gore
did not directly address how to deal with the defendant's unlaw-
ful activity outside of the state, State Farm made it clear that "as
a general rule" a state has no "legitimate concern in imposing pu-
nitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts commit-
ted outside of the State's jurisdiction." 2 The Court concluded that
the reprehensibility guidepost does not allow courts to expand the
scope of the case to punish the defendant for any malfeasance;
only the specific conduct that harmed the plaintiff and conduct
similar to that which harmed the plaintiff is relevant to the rep-
rehensibility analysis.8 3
Building on Gore, the State Farm Court listed factors for con-
sideration when analyzing reprehensible conduct.' The Court
stated that it has instructed courts to consider whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
78. Id. at 1522.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1523.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1522.
83. Id. at 1524.
84. Id. at 1521 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)). For
an example of the application of these factors by another court, see Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer,
111 S.W.3d 346, 360 (Ark. 2003).
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vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an iso-
lated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
8 5
The State Farm Court refined the list of factors that can consti-
tute reprehensible acts,86 and clarified that, while the existence of
any one of the listed factors in the plaintiffs favor may not neces-
sarily be enough to support a punitive damages award, the ab-
sence of all of these factors renders a punitive award suspect.8 7
The Court emphasized that punitive damages should only be
awarded if, after compensatory damages are paid, the defendant's
conduct is so reprehensible that further penalties serving as a
punishment or a deterrent are warranted.88
2. Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages
The Court in State Farm, as it did in Gore, refused to set a
clear limit on the second guidepost-the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages.8 9 Although it gave no definite
limit, the State Farm majority did offer some clarity when Justice
Kennedy wrote that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant de-
gree, will satisfy due process."9 ° State Farm upheld the sliding-
scale approach to ratios from Gore, where greater ratios can exist
if the defendant's conduct was particularly egregious and resulted
in only a small amount of economic harm, or when the injury may
be hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm dif-
ficult to determine.91 The Court further refined Gore's second
guidepost, stating that where compensatory damages are sub-
stantial, as Campbell's $2.6 million was, "then a lesser ratio, per-
haps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outer-
most limit of the due process guarantee." 2 In sum, the State
Farm endorsement of single-digit multipliers and favoring of a
85. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77).
86. Compare State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521, with Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77.
87. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1524.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
2004]
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low ratio in cases of high compensatory damages refine Gore but
are not substantial alterations.
3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
The third and final Gore guidepost required a comparison of
punitive damages to civil and criminal sanctions for similar con-
duct.93 The most relevant civil sanction in Utah for the harm done
to the Campbells was a $10,000 fine for fraud.94 This sum was
dwarfed by the $145 million punitive award; thus, little time was
needed for the Court to find the punitive award in discord with
the third Gore guidepost.9 The Court stated that the Utah Su-
preme Court erred in speculating about State Farm's potential
loss of business license and imprisonment based on a broad
fraudulent scheme of dissimilar out-of-state conduct.96 Here, the
Court came back to the same language it used under the degree of
reprehensibility analysis: "out-of-state and dissimilar conduct"
cannot be considered when assessing excessive punitive awards.97
The Court further cautioned that "[plunitive damages are not a
substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive dam-
ages award."' As the Court noted, criminal penalties merit
higher protections and a higher degree of proof than civil penal-
ties.99
C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Theoretical Based Objections
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg each wrote separate
dissenting opinions in State Farm, all of which presented funda-
mental problems in limiting punitive damages. Justices Scalia
and Thomas wrote very brief dissenting opinions in State Farm
93. Id. at 1526.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 82.
98. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
99. Id.
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which referenced their joint dissent in Gore, ' where Justice
Scalia wrote that the majority's decision in Gore was an "unjusti-
fied incursion into the province of state governments."'0'1 Justices
Scalia and Thomas's conclusion in Gore came from the belief that
the Constitution does not provide any safeguards against unfair
punitive awards.0 2 Taking a textualist approach, Justice Scalia
wrote in Gore that the Fourteenth Amendment contains no sub-
stantive guarantees against an unreasonable punitive award:1
0 3
"What the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural guarantee as-
sures is an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a dam-
ages judgment in state court; but there is no federal guarantee a
damages award actually be reasonable."0 4 Justice Scalia in fact
asserted that the Court "simply fabricated the 'substantive due
process' right at issue" when deciding Gore, °5 implying that the
Gore Court was practicing judicial activism in its decision. Thus,
according to Justices Scalia and Thomas, without an explicit con-
stitutional basis for the Court to consider the issue of excessive
punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, doing so is an invasion into the states' domain.' 6
Justice Ginsburg also felt that the majority's decision unconsti-
tutionally imposed upon the states.17 Outlining the history of
cases leading up to Gore, Justice Ginsburg demonstrated the
Court's established precedent of upholding state court punitive
damages awards.' 8 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the majority
in State Farm was invading "'territory traditionally within the
States' domain '' O° as it did in Gore. She further stated that she
found no justification for the "Court's substitution of its judgment
for that of Utah's competent decisionmakers.""' ° She concluded, as
100. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This view... adheres to the text of the
Due Process Clause.").
104. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1527 (2003) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing)).
110. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2004]
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she had in Gore, that the majority had "no warrant to reform
state law governing awards of punitive damages."' This position
serves as the foundation for the second part of Justice Ginsburg's
dissent, which undermined the majority's opinion on a more tan-
gible, factual basis.112
2. Factual Based Objections
Supporting the findings of the Utah Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg argued at length that the facts of the case showed that
State Farm's out-of-state fraudulent activity was indeed similar
to the activity that harmed the Campbells."' Although the par-
ticular facts were specific to State Farm, Justice Ginsburg's ap-
proach presented the weighted question of what constitutes "simi-
lar conduct."" 4 Asserting that the Court largely abbreviated the
story of State Farm's conduct, Justice Ginsburg felt that the
Court should have considered much more of State Farm's activity
in its reprehensibility analysis." 5 Justice Ginsberg pointed to ex-
tensive facts on the record that the Court did not address which
show State Farm's reprehensible conduct. 1 6 For example, accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg, there was much evidence to support the
jury's finding that State Farm's treatment of the Campbells typi-
fied the company's review program." 7 Implemented in 1979, this
program had "'the explicit objective of using the claims-
adjustment process as a profit center"' by paying out less than
fair value to clients so that it could meet certain arbitrary targets
designed to increase profit." 8 Justice Ginsburg felt, as the jury
did, that this conduct undoubtedly harmed Utah residents, as
well as the Campbells specifically." 9 She concluded that there
111. Id. at 1531 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
112. See id. at 1530-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1527-30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1527-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing State Farm's activities at
length and how these activities were similar to the conduct that harmed the Campbells).
115. Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1527-30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1527-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a).
119. Id. at 1528 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38:545
RESTRICTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
was surely a "nexus" between much of State Farm's conduct and
the particular harm suffered by the Campbells. 2 °
IV. ANALYSIS, RECEPTION, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE
FARM DECISION
A. Analysis of State Farm's Refinements on Gore
While State Farm does alter Gore to some extent, the changes
are not dramatic. Of the three Gore guideposts, the degree of rep-
rehensibility is the guidepost most altered by State Farm. A clear
nexus is now required between the defendant's activities and the
plaintiffs harm. 1 ' Furthermore, dissimilar activities by the de-
fendant cannot be considered in the analysis. 2 2 In refining Gore,
the State Farm Court stated that as a general rule a state cannot
impose punitive damages for unlawful acts committed by the
defendant outside of the state's jurisdiction.'23 However, there is
some room for an exception to this general rule:
The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the
scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any mal-
feasance .... In this case, because the Campbells have shown no
conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the con-
duct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehen-
sibility analysis.'
24
In holding that unrelated malfeasances cannot be considered,
the Court implies that malfeasances that are similar to the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff could possibly be considered in the
reprehensibility analysis, even if the similar malfeasance is out-
of-state conduct. 12  Presumably, the out-of-state malfeasance
would need to be sufficiently similar to the conduct that harmed
the plaintiff to be considered to have a nexus to the harm suffered
by the plaintiff.126 While Gore strongly discouraged considering
120. Id. at 1531 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1522.
122. Id. at 1523.
123. Id. at 1522.
124. Id. at 1524.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1522.
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out-of-state conduct, State Farm suggests that out-of-state con-
duct is valid if truly similar to the conduct that harmed the plain-
tiff.1
27
The second Gore guidepost-the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages-is perhaps the most tangible guidepost
because it is one of numeric representation. The Court's state-
ments favoring single-digit multipliers in State Farm provide bet-
ter guidance than what Gore offered,128 but the Court still refused
to fix any limits on ratios. Justice Kennedy noted that ratios used
in previous punitive damage cases were not binding but instruc-
tive,'29 which preserves flexibility. Thus, the Court only gave
guidance with regard to ratios and did not set rigid limits. Al-
though a set ratio would provide instruction, such a rigid numeric
system would likely endanger a thorough case-by-case analysis in
determining punitive awards.
Although the third and final Gore guidepost received cursory
treatment in State Farm, the Court touched on an inherent dan-
ger-comparing punitive damages to civil and criminal penalties
can tend to equate punitive damages with criminal penalties. 30
Both share the same purposes of punishment and deterrence, but
the State Farm Court pointed out that criminal penalties merit
heightened protections including higher standards of proof. 3' The
Court cautioned that punitive damages are not to be viewed as a
substitute for the criminal process.'32 Therefore, the State Farm
majority was not at ease with a comparison of punitive damages
to criminal penalties when determining the dollar amount of a
punitive award. In fact, the Court did not even look at Utah's
criminal sanctions for similar conduct.'33 Although the third Gore
127. John Gibeaut, Supreme Court Tightens Punitive Damages, 2 A-B.A. J. E-REP. 14
(Apr. 11, 2003).
128. Compare Justice Kennedy's statement from State Farm that "few awards exceed-
ing a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant de-
gree, will satisfy due process," 123 S. Ct. at 1524, to Justice Stevens's opinion in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, supporting a "reasonable relationship" between exemplary
and compensatory damages, 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996). For further discussion, see su-
pra note 53 and the accompanying text.
129. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio
which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.").
130. Id. at 1526 (cautioning that "great care" must be taken to ensure that the civil
process is not used to assess criminal penalties).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
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guidepost allows for a comparison of punitive damages to similar
state civil and criminal penalties that could be imposed, and the
State Farm Court noted that it has considered both civil and
criminal penalties in the past,'34 the majority changed its ap-
proach. In State Farm, the Court refused to compare the punitive
award to the state's criminal penalty for similar conduct when it
assessed the dollar amount of the punitive award. 3 ' The Court
pointed out that "[t]he existence of a criminal penalty does have
bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful
action."'36 Therefore, a state's criminal penalty for similar conduct
is not entirely removed from a punitive damages analysis, but it
is clear that the Court does not support consideration of such
criminal penalties in reaching a dollar amount for punitive dam-
ages under the third Gore guidepost.'37 The Court's words suggest
that consideration of criminal penalties, as far as they indicate
the state's perspective on the seriousness of the wrongful act, may
be more appropriate under the reprehensibility analysis.
B. Reception and Implementation in the Lower Courts
Although State Farm refines Gore to an extent, the Court still
refused to put an absolute limitation on punitive damages and
continued a flexible case-by-case approach when determining
whether punitive damages are unconstitutionally excessive as it
did in Gore.'3 Lower courts have received State Farm with mixed
reviews.'39 The District Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama deliberately waited for the State Farm holding before decid-
ing a case on its docket, but was disappointed with the outcome,
stating that it was "not sure that the wait was worth it."'4 ° The
Alabama court admitted that it was not sure it understood all of
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-87 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (accepting the majority's refusal to set a fixed constitutional limit on punitive dam-
ages as the Court did in an earlier case, but distinguishing Gore from that previous case
on a factual basis).
139. See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2003);
Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 259 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Madeja v. MPB
Corp., 821 A.2d 1034 (N.H. 2003).
140. McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
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the lessons of State Farm and lamented that the case it was cur-
rently deciding was so factually and procedurally different from
State Farm that it was of little help. 141
Ironically, this court's frustration illustrates why the Supreme
Court continues to refuse to draw a bright-line of excessive puni-
tive damages-each case requires an individual factual analy-
sis.' Nonetheless, even this frustrated district court found some
parts of the State Farm holding helpful.14 3 As most other lower
courts have done, it gravitated to the major points of State Farm:
(1) requiring a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the
conduct that harmed the individual plaintiff in the reprehensibil-
ity analysis;'" (2) considering the clarified factors of reprehensi-
ble conduct;1 45 and (3) sticking to single-digit multipliers in the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. 46 At least to
some extent, State Farm refined the ambiguity of Gore enough to
be somewhat instructive for lower courts. On May 19, 2003, the
Supreme Court vacated a judgment of $290 million in punitive
damages in Ford Motor Co. v. Romo 4' and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of State Farm,4 illustrating that
the Court itself views its State Farm holding as instructive for
lower courts and the controlling law on excessive punitive dam-
ages.
C. Implications of State Farm
State Farm, in limiting the breadth and depth of punitive dam-
ages, was a victory for the business community and its defense
attorneys.'49 Because State Farm requires a nexus between the
defendant's conduct and the conduct that harmed the plaintiff,
the send-a-message approach of using punitive damages to pun-
ish a defendant for bad business practices, which had been used
since Gore, is now limited in scope to the particular business
141. Id.
142. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
143. McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
144. See Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
145. See id. at 970; Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1049-50 (N.H. 2003).
146. See McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-31; Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72.
147. 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003).
148. Id.
149. See Gibeaut, supra note 128.
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practices that harmed the individual plaintiff before the court.5 °
Large-sum punitive damages for generally unpleasant business
practices should no longer stand. 1' Also, potential problems of
multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct are now
better limited by State Farm. 2 The State Farm opinion refer-
enced the problem of multiple punishments, where, in theory, if
punitive damages are permitted for harm done in the aggregate
and not limited to actions directly connected to the plaintiff, then
the defendant may be punished several times for the same con-
duct. 5 3 Because punitive damages must now be limited to the
conduct that harmed the individual plaintiff, a defendant can no
longer be forced to pay punitive damages for generally bad busi-
ness practices in several separate cases.'54 Furthermore, the en-
dorsement of single-digit multipliers in the punitive-to-
compensatory ratio means that in most cases judgments will no
longer reach as deep into defendants' pockets.
One -imagines plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers to be disheart-
ened by the State Farm holding because it generally restricts pu-
nitive damages. However, the specificity that State Farm did offer
provides instruction for plaintiffs' lawyers on how to build a case
where the punitive damages, if awarded, will hold. 5 Plaintiffs'
lawyers should consider the clarified reprehensible factors of a
defendant's conduct, 56 and be sure to show a clear nexus between
the defendant's conduct and the conduct that harmed the plain-
tiff.'57 Also, where a nexus exists, similar fact evidence can be in-
troduced against the defendant.' 8 While potential loopholes may
exist in State Farm, such as potentially allowing clearly unlawful
150. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Supreme Court's Recent Bombshell Punitive Damages
Decision: Its Important Holdings and Implications, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/
20030421.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
151. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1523 (2003)
(stating that a defendant should not be punished for being an unsavory business).
152. See generally Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Puni-
tive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003)
(rejecting multiple punitive damages awards).
153. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
154. See id.
155. See generally Charles J. Surrano, III, Strategies for Obtaining Punitive Damages,
in ATLA WINTER 2003 CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, WL Winter 2003 ATLA-CLE
339 (explaining how to apply Gore).
156. See id. (listing the original factors from Gore).
157. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
158. See Gibeaut, supra note 128.
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out-of-state activity that is similar to the conduct that harmed
the plaintiff, the Court's cautions against high punitive awards
and substituting punitive damages for criminal penalties suggest
that such loopholes are not large and may soon be closed.
V. CONCLUSION
From a historic and academic perspective, the State Farm deci-
sion was a step in the right direction toward returning punitive
damages to their proper position."9 Overreaching punitive
awards may have survived limitation for so long due to their his-
torical pedigree. 6 ' The Court was perhaps slow in recognizing
this possibility. It was not until after nearly two decades of esca-
lating punitive awards that the Court noted it would be "inappro-
priate to say that, because punitive damages have been recog-
nized for so long, their imposition is never unconstitutional."
61
The concept of using punitive damages as punishment for general
societal wrongs goes beyond the purpose of punitive damages as
punishment for individual private wrongs. Once a civil punish-
ment is extended past a private wrong, 62 the constitutional basis
for punitive damages no longer exists under a historic analysis.1
63
Reigning in punitive damages as State Farm does, by requiring a
nexus between the defendant's conduct and the harm done to the
plaintiff, helps to realign punitive damages with their historic
function of punishing only the wrong done to the individual
plaintiff.
Bridget E. Leonard
159. See Colby, supra note 153, at 613-42 (discussing the historical basis of punitive
damages and the state of punitive awards after Gore, but prior to State Farm).
160. Id. at 646.
161. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
162. See Colby, supra note 153, at 647.
163. Id.
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